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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout this comment repeated references are made to "civil
rights" and "public accommodations;" thus these terms require a defini-
tion which will allow the reader to place his views in perspective with
those expressed in this comment.
Various theories have been promulgated as to what are "civil rights,"
if such rights do exist.2 "Civil rights" have been referred to as "absolute
rights" which are the outgrowth of civilization; 8 as those rights of
positive law not existing at common law, but enforceable only under
statutory law;" and, as those rights which might better be termed
"moral" or "natural rights."5
Since legislation is the primary concern of this comment, "civil
rights" can be said to be those human rights, which can be found in fed-
eral statutes enacted in the spirit of the Federal Constitution, and in
1. This comment is limited to the public accommodations portion of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. It is noted that the 1964 Act encompasses many more areas, but they could not be
adequately covered in a comment of this length.
2. It is arguable that civil rights as such did not exist at common law and did not come
into existence until recognized by statutory enactments. See Riggs, The Existence of Civil
Rights at Common Law, 5 S.C.L.Q. 449 (1952).
3. People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869); Grooms v. Thomas, 93 Okla. 87, 219 Pac.
700 (1923) ; Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 139 Pac. 948 (1914).
4. State v. Powers, 51 N.J.L. 432, 17 Adt. 969 (1889); Wilson v. Gonzales, 44 N.M. 599,
106 P.2d 1093 (1940).
5. Suit v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 31, 3 So.2d 729 (1941) ; State v. Powers, 51 N.J.L. 432, 17
Adt. 969 (1889); Wilson v. Gonzales, 44 N.M. 599, 106 P.2d 1093 (1940).
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state statutes enacted under state constitutional provisions. Thus only
those interpretations of "civil rights" which uphold the constitutionality
of the legislation guaranteeing them are legally sanctioned.
In view of the private property rights of individuals, public ac-
commodations is an often debated concept. It is argued that these estab-
lishments are not "public" in the sense of requiring admission of all per-
sons who wish to patronize them." "Public accommodations" can be
defined as businesses offering lodging, food and entertainment to the
general public. Although it is impossible to compile a complete list of
all "public accommodations," the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes the
following:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests . . .
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter,
soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling
food for colusumption on the premises...
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports
arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or enter-
tainment .... 7
For purposes of analysis of these accommodations, it is essential to de-
termine whether the establishments in question are state supported or
privately owned." This is also a meaningful distinction for purposes of
applying the fourteenth amendment.'
The enjoyment of "public accommodations" by Negroes is a chapter
of American history which has been frustrating, confusing and wrought
with mixed emotions. Both federal and state legislation have been passed
only to have their purposes frustrated by individual as well as judicial
action.' ° Thus, the "civil rights" struggle, in the absence of effective
legislation, has often succumbed to the unfortunate remedy of self-help
on the part of both proponents and opponents of the movement."
6. Ashley, Personal Rights vs. Property Rights, 20 A.B.A.J. 49, 54 (1934):
The constitutions guarantee "life, liberty and property." The first two are of little
avail without protection in the enjoyment of enough of the third to make life
fairly secure and liberty worth having.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 352, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(b)(1)-(3)
(July 2, 1964).
8. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains Title III which pertains to the desegregation of
"any public facility which is owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of any State .. .
§ 301(a).
9. The concept of "state action" must be dealt with when attempting to regulate
"public accommodations" through the implementation of the fourteenth amendment. At the
present time the actions of the operators of privately owned public accommodations are not
considered state action. However, contrary views were expressed in Harlan's dissent in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and in Douglas' concurring opinion in Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348 (1964).
10. See generally, section II, B, 1-2 of this comment.
11. A few names like Little Rock, Birmingham, Jackson, Montgomery, St. Augustine,
and Selma quickly recall the disconcerting evils of self-help.
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A span of a hundred years has passed since the Civil War and the
Emancipation Proclamation, 2 and approximately ninety years has passed
since the last significant federal attempts at public accommodations
legislation. 8 Although there have been many relatively unsuccessful
state efforts in this area,' 4 the Civil Rights Act of 1964' was the first
federal attempt of this century.
Discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has generated contro-
versy over whether an individual civil right should be preferred over
another's property right.'" The new law has raised innumerable ques-
tions: will the Act effectuate the Negro goals; are the Negro demands
proper ones; was the passage of the Act a proper exercise of Congres-
sional power; what are the Constitutional ramifications of the Act; and,
should such legal endeavors have been left to the states?
When the various segments of the country disagree on the fundamen-
tal principles underlying the civil rights movement, they must necessarily
disagree on the means which should or should not be used to effectuate
any right which the Negroes claim. This comment attempts to place the
area of public accommodations in its proper historical context and de-
fine the present status of public accommodations under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
A. Public Accommodations at Common Law
At common law certain businesses were required to serve the gen-
eral public.' 7 For example, innkeepers were considered to have impliedly
given a general invitation to the public to enter the inn and to use its
facilities.' 8 Other decisions gave the innkeeper the prerogative of refusing
service to someone for good cause.' 9 Of course, questions arose as to what
constituted an inn;20 who was a guest and when did he achieve such
12. 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
13. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), was the last "public accommoda-
tion" act enacted by Congress.
14. See generally, section II, B, 2 of this paper.
15. Pub. L. No. 352, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 2, 1964).
16 See Ashley, Personal Rights vs. Property Rights, 20 A.B.A.J. 49 (1934).
17. See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON irux LAWS OF ENGLAND, Vol. 3, Ch. IX (10th ed.
1787); 1 A.L.R.2d 1165 (1948):
[A]t common law a person engaged in a public calling, such as an innkeeper or
common carrier, was under an obligation to serve, without discrimination, all who
sought service ....
18. Kisten v. Hildebrand, 48 Ky. 72 (1848); Adams v. Freeman, 12 Johns. 408 (N.Y.
1815); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 431 (Pa. 1850).
19. Kisten v. Hildebrand, 48 Ky. 72 (1848) ; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas.
431 (Pa. 1850); Regina v. Rymer, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 378 (1877).
20. Hall v. State, 4 Harr. 132, 147 (Del. 1844):
'[Elvery inn is not an ale-house, nor every ale-house an inn,' but if an inn uses
common selling of ale, it is also then an ale-house; and if any ale-house lodges and
entertains travelers it is also an inn.
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status;21 and, what should constitute good cause for refusal of service to
any particular individual.22
Later the innkeeper rule was extended to include common carriers.
23
These two categories of proprietors were considered to be public serv-
ants.24 Thus, although the position and responsibilities of the inn and
common carrier were firmly established at common law, the other forms
of accommodation and amusement were not held to the same standards.25
It should be kept in mind that the early common law cases involving
these establishments did not involve racial situations, since, until after
the Civil War, Negroes were considered to be property and the courts
never considered their status under these common law rights.
B. Prior Civil Rights Acts and Public Accommodations Legislation
1. FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND CASES
For a thorough understanding of the present status of public ac-
commodations it is necessary to survey early federal legislation. During
the period of reconstruction after the Civil War, remedial legislation was
passed to insure the political, social, and economic status of the recently
emancipated Negroes.26
In order to give binding legal effect to Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation,' Congress, in 1865, proposed the Thirteenth Amendment
which proclaimed that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude .. .
shall exist within the United States." Upon ratification by the states,
Congress was given the power to enforce this amendment by appropriate
legislation and subsequent interpretation has applied the amendment to
inhibit not only state action28 but also actions of private individuals.9
21. Ross v. Mellin, 36 Minn. 421, 422, 32 N.W. 172, 173 (1887):
If a person puts up at an inn as a traveler, and he is received as such, the relation of
innkeeper and guest is immediately established, with all its rights and liabilities . .. ."
22. In Regina v. Rymer, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 378 (1877), just cause for refusal of service
was sustained when the patron attempted to bring his two St. Bernard dogs into the inn with
him.
23. See BLAcxsroz, CommENTAaiEs oz Trnx LAws OF ENGLAND, Vol. 3, Ch. IX (10th ed.
1787).
24. BNA OPERAnOxS MANUAL, Cvm RiGurs ACT oF 1964, 79 (1964):
The reasoning back of the rule seems to be that innkeepers and common carriers are
in a sense servants of the public, in return for which they are permitted, in the
conduct of their businesses, to exercise certain privileges not enjoyed by the public
in general.
25. 1 A.L.R.2d 1165 (1948):
[Ilt appears that proprietors of privately operated places of public amusement and
entertainment were under no such obligation and could deny admission to whom-
ever they pleased.
26. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L. RaV.
1323 (1952).
27. 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).
28. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
29. Since there is no reference to states in the thirteenth amendment it can be used
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In the Spring of 1866, the fourteenth amendment passed Congress
subject to ratification by the states, but it was rejected by all the
Southern states prior to the time when the reconstruction governments
came into power.8 0 Congress' next action was the passage of the Recon-
struction Act of 186781 which made readmission of southern congressmen
to Congress contingent upon state ratification of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Thus, southerners refer to the fourteenth amendment as being
"more or less ratified in 1868 .... I'll
The fourteenth amendment, passed to secure the position of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,"3 which insured Negroes all the rights enjoyed
by white citizens, soon caused construction problems in the courts because
of its specific references to the states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis
added.)
Meanwhile, racial discriminations in the social, political and eco-
nomic areas were being perpetrated by individual whites under the guise
of state laws. 4 The problem was to determine the intent of the framers
of the fourteenth amendment. Some jurists thought that its power clause,
which authorized Congress to carry out the amendment's provisions by
appropriate legislation, could be construed to reach discriminatory actions
on the part of individuals as well as states.8
5
In 1869, the fifteenth amendment, which guaranteed the voting
rights of Negroes, was passed by Congress and ratified by the states.
The fifteenth amendment stated that "[t]he right of citizens of the
to prohibit privately imposed involuntary servitude. This argument was asserted in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in an effort to show that discrimination in public
accommodations was a form of privately imposed involuntary servitude, but the Court
rejected the analogy.
30. KoNvrrz & LESxEs, A CEUaRY or C=viL RIGHTS 51 (1961):
Before Reconstruction governments took over the states of the South, the amend-
ment was rejected in late 1866 and early 1867 by all the Southern states but
Tennessee.
31. 15 Stat. 2 (1867).
32. Simpson, Public Accommodations Section of the Civil Rights Bill, 25 ALA. LAW.
305 (1964).
33. 14 Stat. 358 (1866).
34. KoNvrrz & LEsKES, A CENTURY OF Civsi. RIGHITS 13 (1961):
Although the [state] Black Codes varied in harshness, they all aimed to withhold
from the Negro the full freedom that his emancipation may have implied to him
and to Northern Republicans.
For a complete digest of state laws on race and color, see MUaAY, STATES' LAWS ON RACE
AND COLOR (1951).
35. This was the position of Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), in regard to public accommodations.
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United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude." ' Voting rights of Negroes were further protected by the
passage of another Act in 1871.11
In its final effort to insure equal rights and privileges to the freed
Negroes, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875.88 This act was
the last congressional attempt at civil rights legislation for eighty-two
years.39 The most significant provisions of the Act were those relating
to public accommodations and the civil and criminal penalties enforce-
able in the federal courts for infringement upon these rights.40
Obtaining Congressional approval of the 1875 Act to insure its
eventual passage by Congress was not an easy task. In fact, the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 was passed five years after its original introduction in
Congress in 1871 by Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. 41 Con-
gress debated extensively on the question of whether or not this Act was
an attempt to legislate social equality for Negroes.42 A provision regard-
ing integration of the schools was also considered but deleted to insure
the final passage of the bill.4"
The public accommodations section of the 1875 Act, closely paral-
lels the Civil Rights Act of 1964:"
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall be entitled to full and equal enjoyment of the accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public con-
veyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations es-
tablished by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race
and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. 5
The significance of this provision of the Act was that it was applicable to
individual offenders and was not dependent upon state action.46
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
37. 17 Stat. 13 (1871); see also, Walz, The Civil Rights Act of 1871: Continuing
Validity, 40 NoTRE DAux LAW. 70 (1964).
38. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). The preamble of the Act illustrates the purpose underlying it:
Whereas, it is essential to just government we recognize the equality of all men
before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its dealings with the
people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever nativity, race, color,
or persuasion, religious or political; and it being the appropriate object of legis-
lation to enact great fundamental principles into law ....
39. The next federal attempt at civil rights legislation came in 1957 with the civil rights
act of that year, 71 Stat. 634.
40. 18 Stat. 335 (1875) ; § 2, pertains to civil suits; § 3, pertains to criminal prosecutions.
41. See KoNviTz & LESKES, A CENrURY OF CiviL RIGHT'S 91 (1961).
42. 3 CoNG. REc. 944-45, 960 (1875).
43. Id. at 944-45.
44. See text, pp. 466-472 infra.
45. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
46. Its applicability to individuals in the absence of state action brought about the
destruction of the Act in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Thus, the American Negro emerged from the Civil War with con-
stitutional and statutory guarantees of full citizenship, equal protection
of the laws, and enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of white
citizens. 7 However, the Supreme Court of the United States, apparently
reflecting prevailing racial views, began to restrict the sweeping scope of
the federal legislation.
The initial blows to the fourteenth amendment, the primary basis
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, were dealt by the Supreme Court in
1873 in the Slaughterhouse Cases. 8 These cases held that the purpose
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was to pro-
tect Negroes from state governmental action and since no state action
was found nor was a racial context presented to the court, the fourteenth
amendment could not be applied. 9 Next came United States v. Cruik-
shank5 ° in 1876, which held that the only obligation resting upon the
United States was to see that the states did not deny their citizens the
enjoyment of an equality of rights. The Virginia v. Rivers51 case of 1879
again restricted the force of the fourteenth amendment when the Court
held "[t] he provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
... all have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action
of private individuals. 52
Finally in 1883, the Civil Rights Cases5" were considered and the
death of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 seemed inevitable. The cases,
consolidated for trial, involved indictments for denying Negroes the
accommodations and privileges of an inn; refusing Negroes full enjoy-
ment of a theater; and, for denying a Negress the privilege of riding in
the ladies' car on a train. In a decision in which only one justice dissented,
the Supreme Court held that Congress has no power to legislate upon
subjects which are within the domain of the state legislatures, but only
to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws and state
officers when they subvert the fundamental rights specified in the Con-
stitution.
In writing the majority opinion, Justice Bradley noted that the
Act was directed not only at state action but at the actions of private
individuals. With the fourteenth amendment as its power source, con-
tinued Bradley, only actions by states, their officers or instrumentalities
could be reached and thus the Act was unconstitutional.
47. The passage of the previously enumerated statutes indicates Congressional intent
to give the freed Negroes full citizenship and equal enjoyment of all rights and privileges
possessed by white citizens.
48. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
49. For a discussion of the case, see Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of the
Slaughterhouse Cases, 18 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1943).
50. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
51. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
52. Id. at 318.
53. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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The majority opinion recognized that the thirteenth amendment
is not limited to state action and could be applied to individuals, but
indicated that denying Negroes public accommodations is not equivalent
to subjecting them to conditions of involuntary servitude. The Supreme
Court concluded that:
[N]o countenance of authority for the passage of the law in
question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution; and no other ground of
authority for its passage being suggested, it must necessarily
be declared void, at least so far as its operation in the several
States is concerned. 4
Only twice in the history of the Supreme Court had federal legislation
been declared unconstitutional: in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison55 and
in 1857 in the Dred Scott case. 6 Now the 1883 Civil Rights Cases
could be added to this list.
In spite of the majority opinion, Justice Harlan was undaunted
in his dissent. He stated that he could not "resist the conclusion that
the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution
have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism." 57 Harlan
contended that adequate authority for the 1875 Act could be found in the
thirteenth amendment, which did more than just prohibit slavery, but
decreed universal civil freedom throughout the United States. Harlan
also explored the "quasi-public concept" within the framework of the
majority's contention that the fourteenth amendment only applied to
state action. He indicated that since public accommodations are charged
with duties to the public and are subject to governmental regulation and
licensing, they are agents or instrumentalities of the state. Thus, asserted
Harlan, a denial of accommodations in these facilities is a denial of rights
by the state and thus these establishments are subject to federal regula-
tion under the fourteenth amendment."
Prior to the present Civil Rights Act of 1964,"' it was speculated
that the Civil Rights Cases did not obstruct the application of the Act
of 1875 to the field of interstate and maritime traffic, or in the District
of Columbia and federal territories.60 However, from a practical stand-
point, it could be safely said that "[t]he great fervor with which the
54. Id. at 25.
55. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
56. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
57. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
58. See Douglas' concurring opinion in the Heart of Atlanta Motel case in section III,
C, 1 of this comment.
59. Pub. L. No. 352, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 2, 1964).
60. See Wormuth, The Present Status of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 6 UTAH L. REV.
153 (1958).
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elected representatives of the people decided to nationalize civil rights
[had] been cooled by the breath of judicial construction."'"
2. STATE LEGISLATION AND CASES
Prior to 1883 and the Civil Rights Cases decision, only a few states
had passed statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommo-
dations. In 1865 Massachusetts was the first state to enact such legis-
lation. 2 The only other state civil rights acts, prior to the ill-fated federal
act of 1875, were those passed by New York"8 and Kansas 64 in 1874.
Following the Civil Rights Cases decision, states took the initiative
and passed civil rights legislation aimed at preventing discrimination in
public accommodations. By 1900 approximately eighteen states had
passed civil rights acts.65 At the present time, thirty-one states have
anti-discrimination laws in the public accommodations area. 6
No significant constitutional impediments have been presented by
the great number of state civil rights statutes.67 In effect, the Civil Rights
Cases implied that in view of the tenth amendment this was an area
which could only be dealt with by the state legislatures.6" Apparently
61. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. REV.
1323, 1357 (1952).
62. MASS. STAT. ch. 277 (1865).
63. N.Y. STAT. AT LARGE, Vol. IX, at 583 (1874).
64. LAWS OF KAN., ch. 49, § 1 (1874).
65. By 1900, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin had civil rights statutes with provisions relating
to public accommodations. For a complete list of all states with public accommodations
laws now in force see the statutes cited note 66 infra.
66. ALASxA STAT. §§ 11.60.230-11.60.240 (1962); CAL. CIVIL CODE, § 51-54 (1954);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1-1 to 25-2-5 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (1961);
DEL. CODE Am. Tit. 6, ch. 45 (1963); IDAHO CODE, §§ 18-7301-18-7303 (1961); ILL.
ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd ed.) ch. 38, §§ 13-1-13-4 (1961), ch. 43, § 133 (1944); IiND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns ed.) §§ 10-901 to 10-914 (1961) ; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 735.1-735.2 (1950) ;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2424 (Supp. 1962); ME. REv. STAT. ch. 137, § 50 (1954);
MD. AiN. CODE, Art. 49B, § 11 (1964); MASS. AiNN. LAWS, ch. 140, §§ 5, 8 (1957), ch. 272,
§§ 92A, 98 (1963); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.343, 28.344 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.09
(1947); MONT. REV. CODE, Tit. 64, § 211 (1962); NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 20, §§ 101 and 102
(1954); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 354, §§ 1, 2, .4, 5 (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. Tit. 10,
§§ 1-2-1-7; Tit. 18, §§ 25-1-25-6 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-8-1--49-8-6 (1963);
N.Y. Civil Rights Law (McKinney ed.), Art. 4, §§ 40, 41 (1946); Executive Law, Art. 15,
§§ 290-301 (1964), Penal Law, Art. 46, §§ 513-515 (1944); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 12-22-30
(1963) ; Orio REV. CODE (Page ed.), §§ 2901.35, 2901.36 (1954) ; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 30.670,
30.675, 30.680 (1963); PENN. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, § 4654 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS, §§
11-24-1-11-24-6 (1956); S.D. SEss. LAWS, ch. 58 (1963); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 13, §§ 1451,
1452 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.010--49.60.170, 9.91.010 (1962); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 942.04 (1958); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-83.1, 6-83.2 (1963).
67. E.g., Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948); Kelley v. State, 25
Ark. 392 (1869); Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898); Donnell v. State,
48 Miss. 661 (1873); People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888). See also 49 A.L.R.
505 (1927).
68. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883):
The truth is, that the implication of a power to legislate in this manner is based
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attacks on these statutes have not been successful in either the state
or federal courts.69 Objections have been made alleging that state civil
rights statutes violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the United States Constitution, but the Supreme Court has disposed
of these arguments and upheld their constitutionality."'
In spite of the constitutionality of the state public accommodations
statutes, many of the acts have fallen into disuse71 and strict construction
by the state courts has severely limited their effectiveness. 2 Several
theories have been advanced to justify the state court's strict construction
of their state statutes. One such argument is that these statutes are in
derogation of the common law and therefore must be strictly con-
strued.73 However, as previously indicated, at common law innkeepers
and common carriers were held to have a public duty to furnish their
facilities to the general public.74 Another reason for strict and narrow
construction of these acts is that many of them provide for penal sanc-
tions, and, therefore, in the interests of the accused the statute must be
construed strictly.75 A third, and perhaps most often debated argument
for strict construction, is that often one person's common law property
right would be infringed upon in the enforcement of the civil rights of
another.7 6 Thus:
the general proposition has been that, to deprive a person of a
common law right, such as the right to conduct a business or
use one's property as one pleases, the person claiming discrimi-
nation must point to a statute expressly covering the situa-
tion.7
7
upon the assumption that if the States are forbidden to legislate or act in a par-
ticular way on a particular subject, and power is conferred upon Congress to enforce
the prohibition, this gives Congress power to legislate generally upon that subject,
and not merely power to provide modes of redress against such state legislation or
action. The assumption is certainly unsound. It is repugnant to the Tenth Amend-
ment .
69. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348, 359 (1964):
As we have pointed out, 32 States now have such [public accommodations] statutes
and no case has been cited to us where the attack on a state statute has been suc-
cessful, either in federal or state courts.
See statutes cited note 66 supra.
70. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
71. For example in 1953 the Supreme Court rejected an argument that public accom-
modations legislation of the 1870's for the District of Columbia had been impliedly repealed
by non-use. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson, Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
72. See Riggs, The Existence of Civil Rights at Common Law, 5 S.C.L.Q. 449 (1952)
which illustrates the narrow construction given state statutes.
73. E.g., People ex rel. Barnett v. Bartlett, 169 I1. App. 304 (1912); Brown v. J. H.
Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N.W. 231 (1909); Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31
(1898).
74. See notes 17-25 supra.
75. E.g., Brown v. Meyer Sanitary Milk Co. 150 Kan. 931, 96 P.2d 651 (1939);
Messenger v. State, 25 Neb. 674, 41 N.W. 638 (1889).
76. See Riggs, The Existence of Civil Rights at Common Law, 5 S.C.L.Q. 449 (1952).
77. Id. at 457.
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In an attempt to counteract some of the judicial devastating con-
struction of purported legislative intent, some states have amended their
statutes and enlarged the list of covered accommodations.78 Other states
have tried the opposite approach and have merely stated in their statutes
that any business or establishment which offers public accommodations
to the general public shall be under the statute.79 Probably the most
favorable argument that could be pressed upon the courts, is that these
statutes are remedial in nature and should be given a more liberal con-
struction to effectuate the legislative intent.8"
It is significant that none of the southern states have any statutes
relating to racial discrimination in public accommodations.8' Thus, the
areas where the incidence of racial discrimination is presumably highest,
do not have any statutes aimed at remedying the situation. Of course,
the most obvious argument against the passage of such statutes is that
the individual's property rights should not be infringed upon. As one
author has indicated:
Since contractual and property rights are part and parcel of
personal rights, it is futile to ask whether property rights are
or should be subservient to personal rights. They are themselves
personal rights. Often they properly give way to other human
rights; such is to the best interest of society. But still they are
personal rights.8 2
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, state statutes were relatively
ineffectual against racial discrimination in public accommodations. If an
end to racial discrimination in public accommodations was desirable, it
was apparent to those who believed in its elimination that the impetus
would never come from the states.
III. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND THE CIVIL RIGHTs ACT OF 1964
Following the fiasco of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the federal
government made no additional attempts at any form of civil rights
legislation until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957,88 which
established the Civil Rights Commission and was concerned with insuring
78. KONVITZ & LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIV RIGHTS 164 (1961):
The tendency of the courts to construe the acts strictly has necessitated frequent
amendments of the civil rights laws by the state legislatures in order to overcome
restrictive decisions; these amendments, in turn, are used by the courts as an argu-
ment against liberal construction.
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 417, § 3267(d) (1953); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (1959).
80. Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475
(1945).
81. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Texas and Virginia do not have state public accommodations statutes.
82. Ashley, Personal Rights vs. Property Rights, 20 A.B.A.J. 49, 54 (1934). See also,
In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888) ; Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829 (1916).
83. 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
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Negroes effective voting rights. Then in 1960 the Civil Rights Act of
that year was passed.84 It contained penalties for the destruction of
churches, interstate transportation of explosives, and additional provi-
sions for guaranteeing the rights of Negroes to vote. Neither of these
Acts bore any direct relationship to discrimination in the area of public
accommodations.
Then, in 1964, Congress passed the now famous (to some "infa-
mous") Civil Rights Act85 dealing with almost the identical public accom-
modations subject matter as that covered in the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
A. Constitutional Basis
Although the past ninety years have reflected changing racial views
in this country, the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 realized that
constitutional basis for the Act must be predicated upon a more effective
power source than the fourteenth amendment and Congress' power to
implement its provisions. Congress, therefore, based the 1964 Act on
the Interstate Commerce Clause and attendant Congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce, as well as its power to implement the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Its own provisions reflect the constitutional basis for the Act:
Each of the following establishments which serves the public is
a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title
if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segrega-
tion by it is supported by State action .... 11 (Emphasis added.)
The Act defines and delineates which types of "operations affect
commerce." "[A]ny inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment" [affects
commerce if it] "provides lodging to transient guests. ' 87 "[A] ny restau-
rant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises"88
affects commerce if "it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a
substantial portion of the food which it serves ...has moved in com-
merce."89 "[A]ny motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports
arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment"9 affects
commerce if "it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams,
exhibition, or other sources of entertainment which move in com-
84. 74 Stat. 86 (1960).
85. Pub. L. No. 352, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 2, 1964). Future references to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in the footnotes will be to the pertinent section of Title I, the public
accommodations portion of the Act.
86. Section 201(b).
87. Section 201(b)(1).
88. Section 201(b) (2).
89. Section 201(c) (2).
90. Section 201(b) (3).
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merce . . . ' Commerce' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States .... ,,92
The Act also delineates when discrimination or segregation is sup-
ported by state action:
Discrimination or segregation by an establishment is supported
by State action within the meaning of this title if such discrimi-
nation or segregation (1) is carried on under color of statute,
ordinance or regulation; or (2) is carried on under color of any
custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State
or political subdivision thereof; or (3) is required by action
of the State or political subdivision thereof. 8
Turning to the arguments relating to the constitutional bases, the
courts have, on various occasions, invoked the commerce clause 4 and
the Interstate Commerce Act95 to prohibit acts of racial discrimination
against persons moving in interstate commerce. 96 It should be noted,
however, that in these cases there was a state statute requiring separation
of the races or racial discrimination on interstate carriers.9" These state
statutes have been invalidated as imposing an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
98
The "commerce clause approach" in conjunction with Congressional
testimony indicating that private discrimination had resulted in impair-
ment of the interstate movement of Negroes, apparently influenced the
framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 However, the inclusion of
establishments which do not serve transient guests but who serve food
or sell a product, "a substantial portion of ... which ... has moved in
commerce' 100 would seem to be on a less substantial constitutional foot-
ing. Not all jurists agree with the "commerce clause approach" as the
91. Section 201(c) (3).
92. Section 201(c).
93. Section 201(d).
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "Congress shall have Power . .. to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several states . .. ."
95. The Interstate Commerce Act was originally enacted as 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
96. E.g., Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1949); Morgan v. Virginia, 328
U.S. 373 (1946); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 US. 485 (1878); Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F.2d 879
(4th Cir. 1951).
97. See note 95, supra.
98. A good example is Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), in which the Supreme
Court invalidated a state statute requiring segregation of races on buses moving interstate
as an undue burden on interstate commerce. For an excellent discussion of these cases, see
Williams, The Commerce Clause in Civil Rights Cases, 7 N.Y.U. Izm. L. Rav. '275 (1952).
99. See Hearing before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1964); S. Rep. No. 872, supra; Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary
on S. 1731, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.; Hearings before House Subcommittee No. 5 on miscel-
laneous proposal regarding Civil Rights, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4; H.R. Rep. No. 914
Supra.
100. Section 201(c)(2). The impact on commerce would seem to be questionable on
the mere basis that food had moved in commerce, but the Court in Katzenbach v. McClung,
85 Sup. Ct. 377 (1964) validated this section of the act.
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proper basis for the Civil Rights Act, as indicated by .the views of Justice
Simpson of the Alabama Supreme Court:
[T]he administration's bill places primary reliance upon
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The theory here is
that acts of private discrimination substantially affect the flow
of commerce, and because the Constitution vests in Congress
a power to regulate commerce among the several States, the
Congress has power to prohibit such acts of private discrimina-
tion. Many fine constitutional lawyers disagree entirely with this
far-fetched construction of the Commerce Clause .... 101
In regard to discrimination or segregation supported by state
action, no great constitutional impediment arises. The fourteenth amend-
ment has been interpreted to apply to "state action," and numerous deci-
sions essentially cover the three specific references to requisite state action
in the Act. °2
B. Analysis of Title II
Section 201(a) states the purpose of Title II which is the heart of
the public accommodations portion of the Act:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined
in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion or national origin. (Emphasis
added.)
An analysis of the public accommodations sections of the act necessitates
determining the applicability of the Act to the various types of public
accommodations.
1. ESTABLISHMENTS WHICH PROVIDE LODGING
"[A]ny inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides
lodging to transient guests"0 3 is within the scope of the Act with the
following exception: "an establishment located within a building which
contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually
occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence."' 0 4
101. Simpson, Public Accommodations Section of the Civil Rights Bill, 25 Ar.A. LAW.
305, 306 (1964).
102. The following cases illustrate the sweeping interpretations given to find the requi-
site state action: Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (city officials' discriminatory
announcement held to be state action) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court
enforcement of restrictive covenant held to be state action); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1945) (ultra vires acts done under color of state law by state official held to be
state action); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (ultra vires act of state official held
to be state action); Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943) (inaction of
state official under duty to act held to be state action.)
103. Section 201(b) (1).
104. Ibid. (Emphasis added).
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Thus any establishment, including establishments with more than
five rooms, can be exempt from the operation of this section of the Act if
it does not provide lodging for "transient guests."' 05 In addition, any
establishment which contains not more than five rooms for rent and the
proprietor actually lives in the same building in which the rooms are
located would be exempted from the Act's operation even though the
establishment provided lodging for transient guests.
It should be noted that, even though the establishment with five
rooms may be exempted from the lodging provisions of the act, if it
serves food it must satisfy the food requirement specified below.
2. ESTABLISHMENTS WHICH PROVIDE FOOD
"[A]ny restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda foun-
tain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consump-
tion on the premises"' °6 is within the provisions of the Act if the business'
operations affect commerce. Any one of the above mentioned businesses
are said to affect commerce if "it serves or offers to serve interstate
travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves . . . has
moved in [interstate] commerce ... 107
The preceding section of the Act also includes food facilities which
are "located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline
station.'10 8 These retail establishments or gasoline stations "affect com-
merce" if "a substantial portion of the .. .gasoline or other products
which it sells, has moved in commerce." 00 Thus, the service of food on
the premises of gasoline stations or retail establishments, such as depart-
ment stores, can be brought under the Act, even though they do not serve
transients and buy all their food locally. The only requirement for
application of the Act to these establishments is the requisite movement
of a "substantial portion" of gasoline or products which they sell in
commerce.
3. ENTERTAINMENT FACILITIES
Establishments engaged in providing entertainment are also sub-
ject to the Act and must avoid "discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.""' "[A]ny motion
picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other
105. The Supreme Court in dealing with the lodging section of the Act in Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348 (1964), has not determined what
constitutes a "transient guest," but since the commerce clause provides the constitutional
basis for the Act, it would seem that the "transient" must move among the states.
106. Section 201(b) (2).
107. Section 201(c) (2).
108. Section 201(b) (2).




place of exhibition or entertainment" '' comes within the purview of
the Act if "it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams,
exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in com-
merce.M
1 2
In this subsection, the reference to "substantial portion" found in
the lodging and food sections of the Act" 3 has been deleted and the Act's
applicability to entertainment facilities is based upon whether the
establishment "customarily" presents entertainment which has moved
in commerce. The courts have not yet judicially determined exactly what
portion of an establishment's entertainment must move in commerce,
before it can be said that the establishment "customarily" presents such
entertainment.
4. THE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS EXPANSION CLAUSE
Subsection 201(b) (4) which follows the three previously noted
public accommodations sections relating to lodging, food and entertain-
ment, greatly expands the scope of the Act. This subsection forbids "dis-
crimination or segregation" in any establishment which is physically
located within the premises of any establishment already covered by the
Act or by any establishment which has any establishment already covered
by the Act "physically located" within its premises. The additional
requirement for the operation of this subsection is that the establishment
not covered by the lodging, food or entertainment section of the Act hold
itself out as "serving patrons" of the already covered establishment." 4
This subsection would bring the facilities found within hotels and
motels, such as clothing stores, barber shops and newsstands under the
Act. The hotel or motel would probably be covered by prior sections of
the Act, but, absent this subsection, the service establishments in the
same building would be exempt. Particularly noteworthy is the fact
that there is no need to connect these service establishments with com-
merce or state action as long as the hotel or motel housing the establish-
ment comes under the original provisions of the Act." 5
5. PRIVATE CLUB EXEMPTION
Subsection 201(e) provides that lodging, food and entertainment
provisions of the Act "shall not apply to a private club or other establish-
ment not in fact open to the public .... [However, private clubs are
not excluded] to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are
111. Section 201(b) (3).
112. Section 201(c) (3).
113. Section 201(c) (2).
114. Section 201(b) (4).
.115. Section 201(c) (4).
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made available to the customers or patrons""'  of a place of public
accommodation as defined by the Act.
The crucial terminology in this section is that a private club must
"in fact" be private, as evidenced by Senator Long's statement:
Its purpose is to make it clear that the test of whether a
private club, or an establishment not open to the public, is
exempt from Title II, relates to whether it is, in fact, a private
club, or whether it is, in fact, an establishment not open to the
public. It does not relate to whatever purpose or animus the
organizers may have had in mind when -they originally brought
the organization or establishment into existence. (Emphasis
added.)" 7
Thus, a private club must be private. This clause indicates the intent of
Congress to prevent a facade, under which a private club could be
organized to insure the patronage of the general public of white cus-
tomers to the exclusion of Negro clientele. The final clause of this
subsection indicates that "a private club" may not discriminate or segre-
gate if it serves the same patrons as those served under the food, lodging
and entertainment section of the Act.
6. SWEEPING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section 202 implements -the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution in its fullest capacity by its references to state action:
All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establish-
ment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if such
discrimination or segregation is or purports to be required by
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a
State or any agency or political subdivision thereof.
The above language indicates that without exception any establish-
ment which is required by law to discriminate or segregate on the grounds
of race, color, religion, or national origin will come within the prohibi-
tions of the Act. The nature of the facility, be it publically owned and
operated, privately owned and operated, or in fact, a private club, is
immaterial. The only apparent saving provision was the Congressional
determination that licensing of the establishment was not enough to con-
stitute the state action needed to bring it under the provisions of Title II.118
7. ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE II
Section 203 prohibits any person from (1) withholding or denying
to any person; (2) threatening or coercing any person, or (3) punishing
116. Section 201(e).
117. BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL, CIVw, RIGHTS ACT OP 1964 349 (1964).
118. 110 CONG. REc. 1879 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1964).
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or attempting to deny to any person, any rights or privileges under the
"public accommodations" provision of the Act. Section 204 provides for
"a civil action for preventive relief" to be instituted by the "person
aggrieved" against any offender of the provisions of section 203. Section
204 further provides that "the court may, in its discretion, permit the
Attorney General to intervene in such civil action if he certifies that the
case is of general public importance.""'
Section 204(c) allows cooperation by state and local authorities
where the state or local authority has a law prohibiting practices similar
to those prohibited in Title II. Thus, where criminal proceedings have
been instituted under a state or local law, no civil suit may be brought
under Title II until thirty days have elapsed from the notification of
state authorities of the infraction. 2 °
In states where no state or local law prohibiting practices similar to
those contained in the Act are found, a civil suit as provided for in
section 204(a) may be instituted. However, the court may refer the case
to the Community Relations Service (established by Title X of the
Act'2 ') if there seems to exist a possibility of voluntary compliance with
the Act's provisions. The Community Relations Service has a period of
sixty days in which to consider the case, but this time can be extended
(not to exceed a hundred and twenty days) if there appears to be a
possibility of settlement. Under section 205, the Community Relations
Service is authorized to conduct investigations, hold hearings and in all
ways "endeavor to bring about a voluntary settlement between the
parties."
Section 206 provides that the Attorney General may bring a civil
suit by filing a complaint in "the appropriate district court of the United
States" whenever he has:
reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons
is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoy-
ment of any of the rights secured by this title, and that the
pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny
the full exercise of the rights herein described. 22
In these proceedings the Attorney General can request the chief judge
of the circuit where the action is pending to empanel a three judge bench.
119. Section 204(a).
120. Section 204(c).
121. Title X, establishes the Community Relations Service. Its purpose is stated in
§ 1002:
It shall be the function of the Service to provide assistance to communities and
persons therein in resolving disputes, disagreements, or difficulties relating to dis-
criminatory practices based on race, color, or national origin which impair the rights
of persons in such communities under the Constitution or laws of the United States
or which affect or may affect interstate commerce.
122. Section 206(a).
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At least one judge is to be a circuit judge, and at least one judge is to be
a district judge of the court in which the action is pending. "An appeal
from the final judgment of such court will lie to the Supreme Court." '128
Section 207(a) relates to the jurisdiction of the United States
district courts and states that they "shall have jurisdiction of the pro-
ceedings instituted pursuant to this title." This section further states
that this jurisdiction shall be exercised regardless of whether or not
the aggrieved party has "any administrative or other remedies that may
be provided by law." Civil suits for injunctive relief are to be the exclu-
sive means of enforcing Title II. But Title II does not preclude any
"State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other
[consistent] Federal or State law."' 24
The sections of Title II relating to enforcement of the Act do not
provide for the imposition of criminal prosecutions or sanctions if a
substantive right has been violated. The Act only provides for bringing a
civil suit, and criminal sanction would only be imposed in the event of a
contempt citation for refusal to obey an injunctive order emanating
from such a 'suit.' 5
C. Testing the Constitutionality of Title II
Three recent United States Supreme Court cases have tested the
constitutionality and effect of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
1. TESTING § 201(b)(1) ESTABLISHMENTS WHICH PROVIDE LODGING
The first case to test the constitutionality of Title II was Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States'26 in which a motel, which had
refused to accept Negro patronage, brought a declaratory judgment
action attacking the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and sought injunctive relief restraining the enforcement of the
Act. A three-judge bench was empaneled pursuant to section 206(b),
and the motel was restrained from further violating the Act.
On appeal the motel contended that Congress had exceeded its power
to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause, that it was being
deprived of its property without due process of the law and without just
compensation, and that forcing the motel to rent to Negroes against
its will, contravened the thirteenth amendment and imposed a form of
involuntary servitude upon the motel owner. The government countered
by asserting that the unavailability of accommodations for Negroes




126. 85 Sup. Ct. 348 (1964).
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the commerce clause had the power to regulate such restraints, that the
fifth amendment does not forbid reasonable regulation and that the
damage resulting from such regulation need not be compensated, and,
that the thirteenth amendment which was passed to abolish slavery can-
not be said to place discrimination in public accommodations beyond the
reach of federal and state law.
Because approximately seventy-five percent of the motel's guests
were out of state transients, the application of section 201(b) (1) of
the Act was not contested. Only the constitutionality of Title II was in
issue. The decision considered the Civil Rights Cases27 of 1883 but found
that the commerce clause had not been considered as a power source for
the 1875 Act. Moreover, the 1875 Accommodations Act applied to all
public accommodations and was not limited to accommodations affecting
interstate commerce.
After noting the Congressional testimony which indicated that
racial discrimination had a direct impact on interstate commerce, 128 the
court applied the following test to determine whether Congress had
properly exercised its power over commerce:
[T]he determinative test of the exercise of power by the
Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the
activity sought to be regulated is "commerce which concerns
more than one state" and has a real and substantial relation
to the national interest.1
29
The opinion stated that "Congress was not restricted by the fact that the
particular obstruction to interstate commerce" was also "a moral ...
wrong.' 1
80
Turning to the motel's claim that it had been deprived of liberty
or property under the fifth amendment, the Court stated that only two
questions need be asked:
(1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that
racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it
had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that
evil are reasonable and appropriate.' 3'
The opinion states that Congress had a rational basis for determining
that racial discrimination affected commerce (in view of Congressional
testimony) and that the means selected were appropriate.
In conclusion, the Court discarded the motel's thirteenth amend-
127. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
128. See note 99 supra.
129. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348, 356 (1964).
130. Id. at 358.
131. Ibid.
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ment argument and upheld the constitutionality of Title II. Although
"Congress could have pursued other methods to eliminate the obstructions
it found in interstate commerce caused by racial discrimination,'132 that
was a matter of policy that rests with Congress and not with the courts.
Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion. expressed the view that
he would rather have seen the Act based upon the fourteenth amendment
than primarily upon the commerce clause, "for the former deals with
the constitutional status of the individual not with the impact on com-
merce of local activities or vice-versa."' 33 Douglas concluded by stressing
two points: (1) that the definition of state action within the Act'34
is in concurrence with the Shelley v. Kraemer case; 1 5 and (2) that
founded upon the fourteenth amendment, individuals would have "the
right to be free of discriminatory treatment (based on race) in places
of public accommodations-whether intrastate or interstate . . .,.
2. TESTING § 201(b)(2) ESTABLISHMENTS WHICH PROVIDE FOOD
In Katzenbach v. McClung,37 a companion case to Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 8 the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of Title II
as applied to the provisions prohibiting discrimination in restaurants
if it serves interstate travelers or if a "substantial portion" of the food
it serves has moved in commerce. McClung, the owner of Ollie's Barbe-
que, would not serve Negroes. However, although McClung served
almost exclusively local patrons, he purchased meat which had come
from out of state. This meat amounted to forty-six percent of the food
McClung sold. The United States district court held that "there was no
demonstrable connection between food purchased in interstate commerce
and sold in a restaurant and the conclusion of Congress that discrimina-
tion in the restaurant would affect that commerce."' 39
McClung admitted that the Act applied to him, but argued that
the Act was not a valid exercise of Congress' power over interstate com-
merce. The Government contended that "Congress had ample basis
upon which to find that racial discrimination at restaurants" which
receive a substantial portion of their food from other states imposes
"commercial burdens of national magnitude upon interstate commerce."' 4
The Supreme Court took special notice of the Congressional hearings
indicating that a burden was being placed on interstate commerce by
132. Id. at 360.
133. Id. at 369.
134. Sections 201(d), 202. See also, Section III, A and III, B, 6 of this comment.
135. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
136. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85 Sup. Ct. 348, 370 (1964).
137. 85 Sup. Ct. 377 (1964).
138. 85 Sup. Ct. 348 (1964).
139. Katzenbach v. McClung, 85 Sup. Ct. 377, 380 (1964).
140. Id. at 381.
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discrimination in restaurants. The fewer patrons a restaurant has, the
less food it sells, and thus the less food it buys. The Court indicated that
racial discrimination by a local restaurant such as McClung's, resulted
in less food sold. Multiplying this decrease in sales by millions of similar
restaurants, the interstate sale of food stuffs would be restricted result-
ing in an impact on interstate commerce. 4 The decision further indicated
that Congress has on previous occasions delved into local activities where
there has been an impact on interstate commerce. 42
The Court concluded by reversing the District Court's decision and
holding that Congress acted within its power in enacting Title II to
"protect and foster commerce in extending the coverage of Title II only
to those restaurants offering to serve interstate travelers or serving food,
a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce.' 143
3. STATUS OF CONVICTIONS UNDER STATE LAW
PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF TITLE II
The third case before the Supreme Court dealing with the problems
arising under Title II is Hamm v. City of Rock Hill.144 This case did not
involve the constitutionality of Title II, but concerned the status of
convictions under state law for "sit-in" demonstrations which were
still pending in the courts at the time of passage of the Civil Rights Act.
The local ordinances and statutes under which these convictions were
rendered are now in conflict with the Civil Rights Act and are superseded
by the Act.
The issue confronting the Court was whether the still pending con-
victions or conduct occurring prior to the passage of the Act were abated
by its passage. The Court in a five to four decision held that:
future state prosecutions under the Act being unconstitutional
and there being no savings clause in the Act itself, convictions
for pre-enactment violations [will] be equally unconstitutional
and abatement necessarily follows. 45
The majority opinion relied on three principles: (1) enforcement
of penalties under state laws now invalid would only serve vindictive
purposes; (2) since federal prosecutions would be abated under similar
141. The Court analogized this situation to the case of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942). In the Wickard case a wheat farmer refused to conform to the federal acreage
allotments, contending that he was only growing the extra wheat for his personal con-
sumption. The Court compelled the farmer to adhere to the federal regulations indicating
that if millions of farmers raised extra wheat for their own consumption, it would have
a tremendous effect on the wheat market.
142. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States,
222 U.S. 20 (1911); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
143. Katzenbach v. McClung, 85 Sup. Ct. 377, 384 (1964).
144. 85 Sup. Ct. 384 (1964).
145. Id. at 391.
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circumstances, state convictions should also be abated under the suprem-
acy clause; and (3) since future state prosecutions could not be had,
and since there was no saving clause in the Act, the state convictions
should be abated.
The four dissenting Justices strongly objected to the majority's
interpretation of the law. The dissenters argued that the Congress never
intended to abate prior state convictions by passage of the Act, that the
intent of the "Saving Statute" was to deter the courts from imputing
Congressional intent to abate prior convictions,14 and that these were
not federal convictions, but state convictions and no federal doctrine
should be used to abate them.
IV. CONCLUSION
The future of civil rights is difficult to envision, but it is apparent
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will be a strategic force in the molding
of future human relations. In many respects the tables of racial conflict
have been turned by the Act:
where segregation had the support of local and state law, mi-
nority groups now enjoy support of federal laws; where pro-
testors of segregation were law violators, segregators are now
guilty of a civil or criminal offense.'47
At first blush the constitutional basis of the Act seems questionable,
when considering the impact on interstate commerce of a restaurant
which does not serve transients but merely buys food out of state.
14 8
Yet, in view of the trend of Supreme Court decisions involving racial
discrimination, there can be no doubt but that the courts will continue
to sustain the constitutionality of the Act.' 49
The next few years will bring about a great many interpretations
of the 1964 Act since many of its terms have not yet been defined by the
146. 16 Stat. 432 (1871).
147. Cothran, The Negro Protest Against Segregation in the South, 357 Annals 65, 68
(1965).
148. Katzenbach v. McClung, 85 Sup. Ct. 377 (1964).
149. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (upheld right of NAACP and its
lawyers to meet to aid individuals denied constitutional rights); Gibson v. Florida Legis-
lative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (NAACP President could not be compelled
to divulge names on a membership list in his possession at the time of committee investi-
gation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversed criminal conviction of
Negroes picketing on state capitol grounds protesting discrimination); Bailey v. Patterson,
369 U.S. 31 (1962) (no state may require segregation of inter or intra state transportation
facilities); United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1959) (district court could entertain
action against state when voting rights were restricted on racial basis); NAACP vs. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (state could not require production of NAACP membership list) ;
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (segregation of public schools declared uncon-
stitutional); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (state action enforcing racially re-
strictive covenants was unconstitutional).
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courts. Nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful if the "racial pendulum"
will reverse its swing in the near future.
In view of the present racial situation, it is necessary to determine
whether the course pursued by Congress was a proper one from the view-
point of purpose rather than means. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is no
panacea for racial conflict. Many persons feel that this type of forced
integration engenders greater animosity between the races. However, it
could be contended that widespread integration in public accommoda-
tions is accomplished more easily and with less animosity than a token
change. The argument against voluntary integration as a cause of eco-
nomic injury is eliminated by the terms of the Act which place all
establishments on an equal footing. White patrons cannot legitimately
prefer one establishment over another because of a lack of colored cus-
tomers.
Perhaps the loudest protest of those opposing the Civil Rights Act
(with the possible exception of the cry that federal power is again en-
croaching upon the states) is that social change cannot be legislated and
that only a change in thinking can bring about effective integration. How-
ever, solutions for major social problems can and must be guided by
changing institutional patterns. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is destined
to make its imprint on these patterns.
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